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Fear of Gender Favoritism and Vote Choice
during the 2008 Presidential Primaries
Seth K. Goldman, University of Massachusetts-Amherst

It has long been suggested that gender stereotyping undercuts support for female candidates, yet a growing number of
studies—including several analyses of Hillary Clinton’s 2008 presidential campaign—ﬁnd limited evidence of such
effects. By contrast, I ﬁnd consistent evidence of voter gender bias using an alternative approach based on perceptions
of group favoritism. Using new survey measures included on a nationally representative panel survey ﬁelded during the
2008 US presidential primaries, I ﬁnd that many citizens perceive female elected ofﬁcials as likely to steer government
resources toward women, a behavior that most evaluate negatively. Moreover, fear of gender favoritism predicts opposition to Clinton throughout the 2008 Democratic primary campaign, as well as in a hypothetical general election
matchup with the Republican nominee.
Betty Friedan worried then that a woman seen as a threat to men would not get to the White House. But how can a woman who’s not a threat
to men get there?
—Dowd (2006)

T

he question of whether female candidates face gender
bias remains the subject of intense debate in political
science. On the one hand, numerous studies ﬁnd that
voters’ gender stereotypes—that is, their expectations about
how men and women do, and should, act—bias their perceptions of women candidates (e.g., Huddy and Terkildsen 1993b;
Lawless 2004; Rosenwasser and Dean 1989; Sapiro 1981–82).
On the other hand, recent research suggests that beliefs about
gender stereotypes do not inﬂuence vote choice (e.g., Brooks
2013; Dolan 2014), including several analyses of support for
Hillary Clinton during the 2008 presidential primaries (Gervais and Hillard 2011; Huddy and Carey 2009; Kinder and
Dale-Riddle 2012; Tesler and Sears 2010). Running counter
to this growing consensus is a list experiment ﬁelded on a
national survey in 2006 which revealed that 26% of the public
would be “angry or upset” about “a woman serving as president” (Streb et al. 2008). How can we explain these contradictory ﬁndings? One possibility is that social desirability bias
interfered with the assessment of gender stereotypes. Yet experiments that minimized this potential problem using ﬁc-

tional candidates still found no double standard applied to
women candidates (Brooks 2013).
In this study, I offer a new explanation: some voters may
perceive female elected ofﬁcials as likely to favor women over
men in government policy making. Those who fear gender
favoritism expect that female political leaders will show outsized concern for women and “women’s issues,” thus putting
men at a relative disadvantage. By this account, gender discrimination is not just about expectations of masculinity and
femininity but also about expectations of group-interested
behavior by women in positions of power. This should be
especially true for men, who have a clear interest in protecting their group’s superior position in society (Blumer 1958;
Bobo and Tuan 2006) and who are thus likely to be driven by
perceptions of group threat (LeVine and Campbell 1972). Yet
as scholars have found with other types of gender attitudes,
women likely hold negative attitudes about gender favoritism
as well, although probably to a lesser extent than men (Glick
and Rudman 2010; Swim et al. 1995). Similarly, among those
who do fear gender favoritism, its political impact should
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be negative for both men and women, although perhaps with
greater force among men.
To test this approach to voter gender bias, I propose survey measures of fear of gender favoritism and include them
on a ﬁve-wave nationally representative panel survey ﬁelded
during the 2008 presidential primaries. As expected, a substantial proportion of citizens—including somewhat more
men than women—believe that female elected ofﬁcials are
likely to favor women over men, and most evaluate such favoritism negatively. Moreover, cross-sectional analyses show
signiﬁcant associations between fear of gender favoritism and
reduced support for Clinton during the Democratic primaries, and panel analyses show that fear of gender favoritism
predicts within-person change in candidate support over time.
Analyses of a hypothetical general election contest between
Clinton and the Republican nominee, John McCain, also reveal a signiﬁcant impact of fear of gender favoritism. Collectively, these ﬁndings strongly suggest that fear of gender favoritism played a central role in the 2008 presidential campaign.

GENDER STEREOTYPES AND OPPOSITION
TO WOMEN CANDIDATES
Numerous studies have examined the role of gender stereotypes in voters’ reactions to women candidates—that is,
whether voters apply widely held expectations about the personality traits of women in general to the characteristics of
women politicians. Because women in general are stereotyped as having more communal traits (e.g., compassionate
and honest) than agentic traits (e.g., strong and tough), scholars hypothesize that voters will evaluate female politicians
with these same expectations. And indeed, many studies—
including experiments that randomly vary the gender of ﬁctional candidates and surveys that ask about generic male
and female candidates—ﬁnd that respondents perceive female candidates as better able to handle so-called feminine
issues, such as education, health care, and helping the poor,
while male candidates are perceived as better able to handle
so-called masculine issues, such as crime, the military, and
terrorism (e.g., Dolan 2014; Huddy and Terkildsen 1993b;
Lawless 2004; Rosenwasser and Dean 1989; Sapiro 1981–82).
Yet not all studies ﬁnd that gender stereotypes reduce
support for women candidates. Most notably, in a series of
experiments Kahn (1992, 1994) shows that voters’ gender
stereotypes helped female candidates. Voters perceived female candidates as more honest and compassionate, and
as more competent on education, health care, and women’s
issues, but not as any less capable of handling masculinestereotyped issues. By contrast, other experimental evidence
has demonstrated that most people hold a general preference
for male candidates that ultimately undercuts voter support
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for speciﬁc female candidates (Sanbonmatsu 2002). These
contradictory ﬁndings highlight the challenge of studying a
moving target, where the impact of gender can cut both ways
(Huddy 1994; Huddy and Capelos 2002).
In recent years, however, public opinion research has begun to coalesce around a surprising result: minimal gender
bias toward women candidates. During the 2006 US Senate
elections, for instance, respondents to a national survey rated
female incumbents equally to male incumbents on experience and more positively on leadership, honesty, caring, the
economy, and health care (Fridkin and Kenney 2009), and
another 2006 survey found no differences in perceptions of
male and female Senate candidates’ traits (e.g., compassionate
and strong leadership; Hayes 2011). Analyses of the 2010 and
2014 elections echo these ﬁndings: respondents to national
surveys rated male and female House, Senate, and gubernatorial candidates equivalently on a range of traits and issues
(Dolan 2014; Hayes and Lawless 2015, 2016). Finally, a series
of experiments embedded in a nationally representative survey
found no evidence that voters punish women candidates more
than men for lacking experience, crying, displaying anger,
acting domineering, lacking empathy, or having knowledge
gaffes (Brooks 2013). Encapsulating the dominant explanation for this new set of ﬁndings, Hayes and Lawless (2015, 108)
suggest “that the electoral landscape is far more favorable to
women than it was even just two decades ago, when the study
of gender stereotyping was in its heyday.” So although many
people still endorse gender stereotypes of women in general,
they have become less likely to apply those stereotypes to their
evaluations of women candidates (Dolan 2014).
Nonetheless, there remain a variety of conditions under
which we might expect continued gender bias (Hayes and Lawless 2016). For example, when campaign communication highlights stereotypical feminine traits, voter gender stereotypes
reduce support for female candidates, and although voters on
the whole may not associate gender stereotypes with female
candidates, some subgroups do (Bauer 2015a, 2015b). Many
scholars also suggest that female candidates for higher-level
ofﬁce are more likely to be penalized for violating traditional
gender norms (Fowler and Lawless 2009; Huddy and Terkildsen 1993a). Of course, there is no higher ofﬁce in the United
States than the presidency, thus making Hillary Clinton’s
2008 campaign an interesting test of this hypothesis. Not only
that, but Clinton has long been criticized for challenging
traditional gender norms, especially during her years as ﬁrst
lady (Burrell 2001). Moreover, anecdotal accounts of the 2008
campaign suggest that “gender was a pervasive force” (Carroll
2009, 2), with numerous instances of sexist media coverage
reinforcing gender stereotypes (Carlin and Winfrey 2009; Lawless 2009). At the same time, quantitative content analyses have
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uncovered little systematic evidence of explicit gender bias in
mainstream media coverage of Clinton during the 2008 campaign (Lawrence and Rose 2010; Miller, Peake, and Boulton
2010). Still, there were some subtle biases, such as horse race
coverage emphasizing gender differences in group support
and critiques of Clinton as competent yet lacking warmth
(Miller et al. 2010).
Did gender stereotypes undercut support for Clinton during the 2008 campaign? Survey research during Clinton’s
years as ﬁrst lady led many to expect that this would be the
case, given a large division in views of her by gender at the time
(Burrell 2001). Consistent with this expectation, experimental
and survey evidence from the early 2000s found that an increased focus on terror threats activated gender stereotypes,
thus reducing Clinton’s favorability (Holman, Merolla, and
Zechmeister 2011). A more recent study from 2012 suggests
that serving as secretary of state may have helped to inoculate
Clinton from such stereotype effects, although of course this
service came after the 2008 campaign (Holman, Merolla, and
Zechmeister 2017). Perhaps surprisingly then, scholars have
found little evidence that beliefs about gender hurt Clinton in
the 2008 election (Huddy and Carey 2009). Analyses using a
variety of surveys all found that gender beliefs did not signiﬁcantly inﬂuence vote choice (Gervais and Hillard 2011;
Kinder and Dale-Riddle 2012; Tesler and Sears 2010). Notably, these studies operationalized gender beliefs in a variety of
ways—as views about women’s role in work and the home,
modern sexism, benevolent sexism, and hostile sexism—yet
came to the same null result.

A NEW APPROACH: FEAR OF GENDER FAVORITISM
One interpretation of recent scholarship is that the political
impact of gender stereotypes has waned in recent years, leading to less overall voter gender bias against women candidates.
Alternatively, a different—and as yet unmeasured—form of
voter gender bias may be operating. Prior research emphasizes a theoretical approach premised on the idea that stereotypes of what is appropriately “feminine” and “masculine”
produce biased perceptions of women candidates, thus reducing support for women candidates. Here I propose an additional theoretical route in which voters penalize women
candidates on the basis of a fear of gender favoritism, or the
perception that female elected ofﬁcials will favor women over
men in a range of government activities.
For instance, fear of gender favoritism might include government hiring and spending, as well as a focus on issues perceived as aiding women, at the expense of men. Note that
whereas the gender stereotype approach suggests that female
politicians will be perceived as better able to handle so-called

feminine issues like education and health care, the favoritism approach suggests that female politicians will be seen
as likely to use policies to directly beneﬁt women over men.
Some voters might assume, for example, that women in ofﬁce
will try to improve educational opportunities for girls by taking
resources away from boys. Perceptions of gender favoritism, to
the extent that they represent a broad set of beliefs, should also
apply more generally to the expectation that female elected
ofﬁcials will use the levers of government power to systematically redistribute resources from men to women.
On the one hand, it may seem unlikely that many voters
will perceive female politicians as so blatantly engaged in
group competition with men, especially given communal stereotypes of women. On the other hand, sexism research clearly
demonstrates that a struggle for dominance characterizes gender relations worldwide (Glick and Rudman 2010). The group
conﬂict approach, although it has been primarily applied to
racial and ethnic relations (Blumer 1958; LeVine and Campbell 1972), may well help to explain the dynamics of gender
politics. To be sure, intergroup relations as they pertain to
gender are unique given what scholars call “intimate interdependence,” or that many men and women live together, rely
on one another, and raise children (often of the other gender)
together (Glick and Rudman 2010, 333). Yet an interest in
gender hierarchy can remain alongside intimacy and affection. Indeed, the central mechanism of this approach is the
perception of competing group interests, rather than personal
or self-interest (Sherif et al. 1961). As Stephan et al. (2000,
64) suggest, “In a world of limited resources, the interests of
men and women are often opposed to one another in the
economic and political domains.” To date, evidence for this
claim comes primarily from the economic domain, with studies ﬁnding that men perceive threats to their group’s interests
following the implementation of afﬁrmative action programs
and the growing advancement of women into management
positions (Beaton, Tougas, and Joly 1996; Tougas et al. 1995).
In political science research, by contrast, the focus has been
almost entirely on race and ethnicity, with studies showing
signiﬁcant effects of perceived group threat on policy views (e.g.,
Bobo 1983, 2000; Bobo and Tuan 2006) and opposition to
minority candidates (Baek and Landau 2011; Goldman 2017).
This study applies the group conﬂict approach to gender
attitudes and hypothesizes that fear of gender favoritism by
female elected ofﬁcials reduces support for female candidates.
Prior research on gender attitudes suggests that men should
be more likely to perceive and negatively evaluate gender favoritism but that many women will hold these beliefs as well
(Glick and Rudman 2010). For men, gender favoritism is
assumed to operate via a perceived threat to their political and
societal dominance; for women, continuous exposure to sex-
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ist cultural messages often leads to acceptance of status quo
hierarchy (Jost and Kay 2005). At the same time, the relationship between gender attitudes and opposition to women
candidates often does not vary by gender (Swim et al. 1995).
Yet insofar as threat may be a particularly powerful motivation, I empirically assess whether the impact of fear of gender
favoritism is larger among men than women in predicting
opposition to Hillary Clinton during the 2008 campaign.

METHOD
To test these hypotheses, I rely on the 2008 National Annenberg Election Study (NAES) Internet panel survey, which
included ﬁve waves ﬁelded between fall 2007 and winter
2009. The 2008 NAES was ﬁelded over the Internet by Gf K
(formerly Knowledge Networks), which recruits nationally
representative samples using address-based sampling and
supplies free Internet access to those who need it. This study
reliesonwave1(October2,2007–January1,2008, N p 18; 663)
and the ﬁrst half of wave 3, before Clinton exited the race and
the gender favoritism items were dropped from the survey
(April 2–June 9, 2008, N p 9; 722). Consistent with prior
studies using Internet probability surveys, the 2008 NAES is
broadly representative of the US adult population (for
comparisons to the July 2008 current population survey, see
app. A; apps. A–C are available online).
To measure fear of gender favoritism, I created survey
items designed to tap perceptions of gender favoritism (i.e., the
extent to which female elected ofﬁcials are perceived as favoring women over men) and attitudes about gender favoritism (i.e., evaluations of gender favoritism as good or bad).
Wave 1 included four perception items, and wave 3 included
the four perception items as well as one attitude item. Table 1
presents the full wording of the items along with their frequencies on wave 3, separately for men and women.
Each perception item assesses a different policy area in
which voters might perceive female elected ofﬁcials as group
interested. Thus, one item asked respondents whether they
believe that female elected ofﬁcials are likely to favor women
for government jobs over male applicants, while another asked
more generally about favoritism toward women in government spending. A third item asked speciﬁcally about perceptions of gender favoritism in the promotion of educational
opportunities, and the fourth and ﬁnal item asked whether
respondents perceive female elected ofﬁcials as likely to focus
on issues that mainly affect women. As shown in table 1, levels
of perceived gender favoritism varied across items and by
respondent gender. On the jobs item, 39% of men and 32% of
women perceived gender favoritism. By contrast, on the education item, just 25% of men and 17% of women perceived
gender favoritism. The corresponding ﬁgures for men and
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Table 1. Perceptions and Attitudes about Gender Favoritism
of American Adults (%)

Perceptions of gender favoritism:
Please tell us to what extent you agree or
disagree with each of the following
statements. Female elected ofﬁcials are more
likely to. . .
1. Favor women for government jobs over
male applicants.
Strongly agree
Somewhat agree
Somewhat disagree
Strongly disagree
2. Promote educational programs
targeted at girls at the expense of boys.
Strongly agree
Somewhat agree
Somewhat disagree
Strongly disagree
3. Support government spending that
favors women.
Strongly agree
Somewhat agree
Somewhat disagree
Strongly disagree
4. Focus on issues that mainly affect
women.
Strongly agree
Somewhat agree
Somewhat disagree
Strongly disagree
Attitudes about gender favoritism:
Thinking about the statements you just
read, would it be good or bad if female
elected ofﬁcials favored women?
Very good
Somewhat good
Somewhat bad
Very bad

Men

Women

5.8
32.8
41.2
20.1

4.6
27.5
43.2
24.6

4.5
20.6
45.9
29.0

2.8
13.8
43.7
39.7

5.2
31.7
39.8
23.2

3.5
28.4
40.2
27.9

5.4
27.2
42.8
24.6

4.1
22.7
42.6
30.6

3.3
26.5
46.7
23.5

6.2
33.4
40.0
20.3

Note. The sample includes the 4,343 male and 5,545 female respondents
interviewed in wave 3. Percentages shown exclude those who refused to answer (ranging from 1.6% to 1.8% of men and 2.2% to 2.5% of women, for
each item).

women on the spending item are 37% and 32%; and on the
issues item, 33% and 27%. Despite variation across the items,
responses were highly correlated, so I averaged them to create a reliable scale (Cronbach’s alphas on waves 1 and 3 are
.89). The summary indicator is coded to range from 0 to 1,
where higher values indicate perceiving more gender favor-
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itism. Overall, men were somewhat more likely to perceive
gender favoritism than women (r p :14 on wave 1 and .10 on
wave 3, p ! :001).
Immediately after the perception items on wave 3, a
follow-up question assessed attitudes about gender favoritism by asking respondents whether they think it would be
good or bad if female elected ofﬁcials favored women. Interestingly, about a third of men (30%) evaluated gender favoritism as a good thing. And although most men evaluated
gender favoritism negatively, just 24% called it “very bad”
versus 47% who chose “somewhat bad.” Among women, 40%
evaluated gender favoritism as a good thing, with the remainder split between “somewhat bad” (40%) and “very bad” (20%).
The gender difference in evaluations of gender favoritism is
modest but statistically signiﬁcant (r p :10, p ! :001). The
measure of attitudes about gender favoritism is coded to range
from 0 to 1, where higher values indicate having more negative evaluations of gender favoritism.
The measures of attitudes about gender favoritism and
perceptions of gender favoritism show a signiﬁcant negative
correlation (2.21, p ! :001). That is, respondents who perceived more gender favoritism were somewhat less likely to
evaluate such favoritism negatively. On the basis of standard
treatments of effect size, the correlation of 2.21 can be considered small to medium in magnitude (Cohen 1992). This is
consistent with my conceptualization of these two indicators
as related but distinct aspects of fear of gender favoritism. In
analyses not shown, I also examined whether perceptions and
attitudes about gender favoritism had a multiplicative effect,
by including interaction terms in all of the models predicting
support for Hillary Clinton, but none of the interactions were
statistically signiﬁcant.
In the next section, I ﬁrst examine whether fear of gender
favoritism reduced support for Hillary Clinton during the
2008 Democratic primaries among self-identiﬁed Democrats.1 I operationalize support for Clinton with self-reported
vote preference, where 1 equals a preference for Clinton and
0 equals a preference for another Democratic candidate. I
control for standard demographics, including race (black),
education (in years), income (in dollars), age (in years), and
region of residence (South); attitudinal variables, including
party strength, perceived relative ideological proximity, perceived relative issue agreement, and perceived viability and
electability; as well as campaign contact and political interest.
I also model racial attitudes using parallel measures of per-

1. Self-identiﬁed Democrats include those who said they were a
“strong Democrat” or a “not very strong Democrat” or felt “closer” to the
Democratic Party.

ceptions and attitudes about racial favoritism. All of the variables range from 0 to 1. Full details and wording for each
variable can be found in appendix B.

RESULTS
Table 2 presents cross-sectional logistic regression models
predicting support for Hillary Clinton during the 2008 Democratic primaries. Columns 1 and 2 show the association between perceptions of gender favoritism and Clinton vote
choice in fall 2007/winter 2008 (wave 1) for male and female
Democrats, controlling for perceptions of racial favoritism
and a variety of other potential inﬂuences. As shown in column 1, among men many standard predictors are signiﬁcantly related to Clinton support, including racial attitudes,
ideological proximity, issue agreement, and perceptions of
viability and electability. Yet even with these factors accounted
for, there is still a negative and marginally signiﬁcant impact
of perceptions of gender favoritism (21.04, p p :05). Among
women, column 2 shows that many of the same factors mattered, although not racial attitudes or perceptions of gender
favoritism (2.24, p 1 :10).2 To ease interpretation of these
ﬁndings, I estimated the conditional probabilities of support
for Clinton at different levels of perceived gender favoritism,
holding all other variables constant.3 Among men, moving
from those who perceived the least to the most gender favoritism is associated with a negative shift in the probability of a
Clinton preference from .34 to .16; among women, the probabilities are .50 and .44. By contrast, moving from those men
who perceived the least to the most racial favoritism is associated with a positive shift in the probability of a Clinton preference from .14 to .49; among women, the probabilities are
.45 and .54.
Columns 3 and 4 of table 2 present models predicting
support for Clinton among male and female Democrats in
spring/summer 2008 (wave 3). The ﬁrst thing to notice is the
much larger impact of perceptions of gender favoritism,
among both men (22.50, p ! :001) and women (21.70, p !
:001), relative to the early campaign period captured on
wave 1. This is especially interesting given that the wave 3
models also include the indicator of attitudes about gender
favoritism, which has a sizable negative impact among men

2. In this and all other models, I examined gender differences in effect
size, by including an interaction term between gender and the favoritism
variables in a fully interactive pooled model. In the wave 1 pooled model,
the interaction between gender and perceptions of gender favoritism is not
statistically signiﬁcant (2.80, p p :22).
3. I held continuous variables at their means and categorical variables
at their modes.
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Table 2. Effects of Fear of Gender Favoritism on Clinton Vote Preference during the 2008 Democratic Primaries: Logit
Fall/Winter 2008
(Wave 1)

Perceptions of gender favoritism

Spring/Summer 2008
(Wave 3)

Men
(1)

Women
(2)

Men
(3)

Women
(4)

21.041
(.54)

2.24
(.36)

22.50***
(.45)
21.60***
(.38)
1.88***
(.37)
1.44***
(.37)
.73**
(.28)
21.34***
(.26)
2.46
(.29)
2.33
(.41)
1.04*
(.49)
.24
(.19)
2.52
(.33)
2.72*
(.29)
.36
(.22)
3.63***
(.18)
1.21***
(.18)
6.47***
(.98)
25.50***
(.65)
2,007
.56

21.70***
(.33)
21.03***
(.28)
1.85***
(.28)
1.39***
(.28)
.44*
(.22)
22.14***
(.20)
2.27
(.22)
.08
(.30)
.26
(.38)
.10
(.14)
2.40
(.24)
2.97***
(.23)
.50**
(.17)
3.41***
(.15)
1.03***
(.14)
5.13***
(.77)
24.22***
(.51)
2,879
.52

Attitudes about gender favoritism
Perceptions of racial favoritism

1.76***
(.45)

.35
(.33)

Attitudes about racial favoritism
Party strength
Race (black)
Education
Income
Age
South
Campaign contact
Political interest
Perceived viability (Clinton)
Perceived electability (Clinton)
Perceived relative issue agreement
Perceived relative ideological proximity
Constant
Sample size
Pseudo-R2

.35
(.31)
2.02
(.36)
2.28
(.38)
2.31
(.47)
2.39
(.52)
2.04
(.22)
.15
(.45)
2.36
(.34)
.89**
(.26)
1.97***
(.20)
2.67***
(.26)
3.38**
(1.16)
25.35***
(.75)
1,063
.42

.60*
(.25)
2.49*
(.20)
2.32
(.30)
2.95*
(.42)
21.11**
(.40)
2.291
(.17)
2.07
(.36)
2.11
(.25)
.57**
(.17)
1.45***
(.16)
2.73***
(.20)
3.74***
(.88)
24.10***
(.56)
1,445
.33

Note. Logistic regression coefﬁcients with standard errors in parentheses among self-identiﬁed Democrats. All variables range from 0 to 1. The pseudo-R2 is
McFadden. In wave 1, the impact of perceptions of gender favoritism does not differ signiﬁcantly by gender (2.80, p p .22). In wave 3, the impact of
perceptions of gender favoritism (2.80, p p .15) and attitudes about gender favoritism (2.57, p p .22) do not differ signiﬁcantly by gender.
1 p ! .10.
* p ! .05.
** p ! .01.
*** p ! .001.
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(21.60, p ! :001) and women (21.03, p ! :001) as well.4
Although the wave 1 and wave 3 models are not strictly comparable, a logical speculation for these differences is that exposure to the campaign, especially news coverage highlighting gender conﬂict in candidate support, further activated fear
of gender favoritism in Democratic respondents’ support for
Clinton. In contrast to the substantial negative effects of beliefs
about gender favoritism, the models show substantial positive
effects of perceptions of racial favoritism (1.88 and 1.85, p !
:001) and attitudes about racial favoritism (1.44 and 1.39, p !
:001) among male and female Democrats, respectively.
Figure 1 shows the predicted probability of a Clinton vote
preference at different levels of the gender favoritism variables. Moving from those who perceived the least to the most
gender favoritism is associated with a shift in the probabilities
from .65 to .13 among men and .72 to .32 among women.
Similarly, moving from those who evaluated gender favoritism
the most positively to the most negatively is associated with
a shift in the probabilities from .67 to .29 among men and .72
to .48 among women. With respect to beliefs about racial favoritism, however, moving from those who perceived the least
to the most racial favoritism is associated with a shift in the
probabilities from .25 to .69 among men and .46 to .85 among
women. And moving from those who evaluated racial favoritism the most positively to the most negatively is associated
with a shift from .22 to .54 among men and .40 to .73 among
women.

Explaining change over time in vote choice
Fear of gender favoritism is signiﬁcantly associated with reduced support for Hillary Clinton on waves 1 and 3. Another
key question is whether fear of gender favoritism can help
explain change over time in Clinton’s vote share at the individual level. In the aggregate, the 2008 NAES shows little
change in Clinton’s overall share of the Democratic vote from
wave 1 (51% of women, 44% of men) to wave 3 (51% of
women, 43% of men). But this aggregate stability overshadows
substantial within-person change in vote choice during this
time period. As shown in table 3, among male Democrats
32.2% of Clinton’s wave 1 supporters defected to Obama by
wave 3, 6.4% of Obama’s wave 1 supporters defected to Clinton, and just 35% of men who initially supported another
candidate moved to Clinton by wave 3. Among female Democrats, table 4 shows that 28% of Clinton’s wave 1 supporters
defected to Obama by wave 3, 12.5% of Obama’s supporters

4. In a pooled model, the interactions between gender, on the one
hand, and perceptions and attitudes about gender favoritism, on the other
hand, are negative but not statistically signiﬁcant (2.80, p p :15, and
2.57, p p :22, respectively).

Figure 1. Effects of perceptions and attitudes about gender favoritism on
the probability of a vote for Clinton during the 2008 presidential primaries,
by gender (wave 3). Probabilities are based on the logistic regression models
in table 2, columns 3 and 4. All other continuous variables are held at their
means, with categorical variables held at their modes. Higher values indicate
perceiving more favoritism and evaluating favoritism more negatively.

defected to Clinton, and fully 48.3% of women who initially
supported another candidate moved to Clinton by wave 3.
Why did some voters leave the Clinton camp, while others
ﬂocked to her side? To examine whether fear of gender favoritism inﬂuenced within-person change in Clinton vote
choice, I employ ﬁxed effects logistic regression, which only
uses within-person variance (Allison 1990, 2009; Halaby 2004).
As a result, ﬁxed effects regression can help us understand
why each individual changed his or her vote choice over time.
Because each person is compared to him- or herself at an
earlier point in time, the stable effects of all other factors—
whether they are observable or unobservable—automatically
drop out. By contrast, other observational designs, including other panel designs, rely on between-person variance, so
they remain open to spurious associations from unmeasured
individual characteristics. With ﬁxed effects, however, only
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Table 3. Spring/Summer 2008 Vote Intentions (Wave 3)
by Fall 2007/Winter 2008 Vote Intentions (Wave 1) among
Male Democrats (%)
Fall 2007/Winter 2008

Spring/summer 2008:
Hillary Clinton
Barack Obama
Total

Hillary
Clinton

Barack
Obama

All
Others

67.8
(473)
32.2
(225)
100
(698)

6.4
(24)
93.6
(353)
100
(377)

35.0
(176)
65.0
(327)
100
(503)

Note. Sample sizes in parentheses. N p 1,578. The vote intentions on
wave 1 for Clinton, Obama, and all others were 44.2%, 23.9%, and 31.9%.
On wave 3, when only Clinton and Obama remained, the vote intentions
were 42.6% and 57.4%.

factors that change over time within persons can inﬂuence the
results. Moreover, in the two-period case the constant in the
model captures the sum total of all other factors that changed;
thus, we need only control for factors that change differentially among individuals (Halaby 2004). For all of these reasons, ﬁxed effects regression provides unusually strong causal
evidence.
Table 5 presents ﬁxed effects logistic regression models
predicting within-person change in Clinton vote choice from
wave 1 to wave 3. Because attitudes about gender favoritism
appeared on wave 3 alone, this analysis only examines the
impact of perceptions of gender favoritism. Importantly, I
model both change in perceptions of gender favoritism from
wave 1 to wave 3 as well as the time-varying effects of initial
levels of perceptions of gender favoritism on wave 1. Although
spuriousness is much less of a concern with ﬁxed effects,
I nonetheless include the same large set of control variables
as in the previous analyses.5
The ﬁxed effects logistic regression models in table 5
predict within-person change in Clinton vote choice from
wave 1, when she enjoyed frontrunner status, to wave 3, when
she dropped out of the race. Note ﬁrst that the sample size
is much smaller than in the prior analyses because this one
only includes respondents who participated in both waves and

5. Perceived electability cannot be included because it was measured in the
latter part of wave 1 and the earlier part of wave 3, so the same individuals did
not answer the items on both waves.

Number 3

July 2018 / 793

exhibited change in vote choice. Because the dependent variable is dichotomous and ﬁxed effects only models withinperson change, any respondent with the same vote preference
on both waves automatically drops out. The table presents the
model for male and female Democrats separately. In both
cases, within-person change in support for Clinton depended
on many of the same predictors identiﬁed in the previous
cross-sectional analyses. But these analyses go much further in
showing that both change in and initial values of perceptions
of gender favoritism signiﬁcantly predicted within-person declines in support for Clinton.6 Change in and initial values of
perceptions of racial favoritism, however, produced signiﬁcant
increases in support for Clinton.
For substantive interpretation, I estimated predicted probabilities using the results in table 5. Among those who became much less likely to perceive gender favoritism, male and
female Democrats had a .73 and .78 probability of becoming Clinton voters, respectively, whereas among those who
became much more likely to perceive gender favoritism, the
probabilities are .45 and .42.7 Levels of initial perceived gender
favoritism had a similar impact. Among those who perceived
little gender favoritism initially, the probabilities for male and
female Democrats are .79 and .74, whereas for those who
perceived a lot of gender favoritism initially, the probabilities
are .45 and .46. In contrast to the negative effects of perceptions of gender favoritism, perceptions of racial favoritism
increased the probability of respondents becoming Clinton
voters. The respective probabilities for change in perceptions
of racial favoritism among male and female Democrats are .47
to .75 and .42 to .79. And for initial perceptions of racial favoritism, the probabilities among male and female Democrats
are .37 to .72 and .40 to .75, respectively.

A hypothetical general election:
Clinton versus McCain
The results thus far provide consistent evidence that fear
of gender favoritism undercut support for Hillary Clinton
during the 2008 Democratic presidential primaries—both in
cross-sectional models as well as far more stringent ﬁxed effects models of within-person change over time. Would these

6. In separate pooled models, the interactions between gender and change
in perceptions of gender favoritism (.59, p ! :61) or initial perceptions of
gender favoritism (2.52, p p :72) are insigniﬁcant.
7. Because of the restricted range of change in perceptions of gender
favoritism, I compare respondents in the 10th and 90th percentiles (2.33
to .33). I also compare those in the 10th and 90th percentiles of initial
perceptions of gender favoritism (0 to .67). I use the same values to calculate the predicted probabilities for change in and initial perceptions of
racial favoritism.
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Table 4. Spring/Summer 2008 Vote Intentions (Wave 3)
by Fall 2007/Winter 2008 Vote Intentions (Wave 1) among
Female Democrats (%)
Fall 2007/Winter 2008

Spring/summer 2008:
Hillary Clinton
Barack Obama
Total

Hillary
Clinton

Barack
Obama

All
Others

72.0
(762)
28.0
(297)
100
(1,059)

12.5
(70)
87.5
(489)
100
(559)

48.3
(227)
51.7
(243)
100
(470)

Note. Sample sizes in parentheses. N p 2,088. The vote intentions on
wave 1 for Clinton, Obama, and all others were 50.7%, 26.8%, and 22.5%.
On wave 3, when only Clinton and Obama remained, the vote intentions
were 50.7% and 49.3%.

same effects be likely to occur during a general election campaign when party identiﬁcation takes on a much larger role?
Although this question cannot be answered deﬁnitively given
that Clinton did not win the Democratic nomination, it is
possible to assess the impact of fear of gender favoritism using
a question included on wave 3 that asked respondents who
they would choose if the 2008 general election pitted Hillary
Clinton versus the Republican nominee, John McCain (where
1 equals support for Clinton and 0 equals support for McCain). The full wording of the question is listed in appendix B.
Table 6 presents the results of logistic regression models
predicting general election candidate preference among male
and female respondents on wave 3. The models include the
standard set of control variables, including the seven-point
indicator of party identiﬁcation scaled to range from strong
Democrat (0) to strong Republican (1). As expected, party
identiﬁcation, perceived ideological proximity, and perceived
issue agreement all show substantial inﬂuence. Interestingly,
those with more conservative beliefs about racial favoritism
continued to be more supportive of Clinton, despite the hypothetical matchup involving two white candidates. This is
consistent with prior research ﬁnding that the Democratic
primary campaign racialized support for Clinton (Tesler and
Sears 2010). Even with all of these inﬂuences accounted for,
table 6 still reveals signiﬁcant negative effects of both perceptions and attitudes about gender favoritism on support for
Clinton. The probability of supporting Clinton over McCain
ranges from .50 among men and .67 among women who

perceived little gender favoritism to .20 and .34 among those
who perceived a great deal of gender favoritism. Similarly, for
attitudes about gender favoritism, the probabilities range from
.69 among men and .76 among women who evaluated gender
favoritism very positively to .22 and .40 among those who
evaluated gender favoritism very negatively. By contrast, beliefs about racial favoritism helped Clinton. The probability of
supporting Clinton over McCain ranges from .30 among men
and .51 among women who perceived little racial favoritism
to .48 and .64 among those who perceived a great deal of racial
favoritism. And for attitudes about racial favoritism, the probabilities range from .20 among men and .50 among women
who evaluated racial favoritism very positively to .47 and .60
among those who evaluated racial favoritism very negatively.

Predictors of fear of gender favoritism
Given the impact of perceptions and attitudes about gender
favoritism, it is important to understand the drivers of these
beliefs. Although the survey was not designed for this purpose,
I provide an initial assessment of the predictors of perceptions
(waves 1 and 3) and attitudes about gender favoritism (wave 3)
using a series of ordinary least squares regression models
in appendix table C1. For each outcome, I ﬁrst model the effects of demographics alone and then add the attitudinal
variables in a second model. Beginning with demographics,
I ﬁnd that men are signiﬁcantly more likely to perceive and
negatively evaluate gender favoritism (i.e., to fear gender favoritism), black Americans consistently express less fear of
gender favoritism, and the higher educated show less fear of
gender favoritism in two out three models. Interestingly, income and age are associated with perceiving less favoritism
but evaluating it negatively.
A number of attitudinal variables are also consistently related to fear of gender favoritism. Consistent with theories of
ethnocentrism (Kinder and Kam 2009), the strongest predictor is fear of racial favoritism. Republican Party identiﬁcation and conservative ideology are also consistently associated with greater fear of gender favoritism. Finally, political
interest shows small but consistent associations with perceiving less gender favoritism but evaluating it more negatively.
Of course, a number of other factors may also matter, although they could not be included on the survey because of
space constraints. Including egalitarianism could be especially
informative, given that fear of gender favoritism might plausibly be a consequence of egalitarian concern about the unfair
distribution of government resources to some groups over
others. Although this seems unlikely given the negative relationship between egalitarianism and modern sexism (Swim
et al. 1995), this study is limited in not being able to test this
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Table 5. Fixed Effects Logistic Regression Models Predicting Within-Person Change in Clinton Vote Choice during the 2008
Democratic Presidential Primaries
Men
Coefﬁcient
Perceptions of group favoritism:
Change in perceptions of gender favoritism
Initial perceptions of gender favoritism
Change in perceptions of racial favoritism
Initial perceptions of racial favoritism
Control variable:
Change in party strength
Initial party strength
Race (black)
Education
Income
Age
South
Change in campaign contact
Initial campaign contact
Change in political interest
Initial political interest
Change in perceived viability
Initial perceived viability
Change in perceived relative issue agreement
Initial perceived relative issue agreement
Change in perceived relative ideological proximity
Initial perceived relative ideological proximity
Constant
Sample size
Pseudo-R2

Women
SE

Coefﬁcient

SE

21.81*
22.32*
1.83*
2.21*

.91
1.07
.81
.94

22.40**
21.801
2.43***
2.27**

.72
.99
.68
.85

.81
2.77
22.50***
2.37
.93
1.551
2.53
2.30
.31
.51
.70
2.93***
1.95**
.98**
21.62**
8.61***
7.93**
23.19*
403
.44

1.30
.53
.66
.57
.94
.87
.39
.71
.80
.68
.67
.50
.70
.37
.55
2.23
2.80
1.52

1.67
2.24
24.24***
.16
.15
.63
.86*
21.041
2.72
.06
.26
2.11***
1.78***
1.35***
21.11*
5.92**
1.92
2.77
562
.48

1.58
.48
.69
.49
.70
.71
.34
.60
.77
.65
.53
.34
.47
.32
.45
1.74
2.15
1.25

Note. Unstandardized ﬁxed effects logistic regression coefﬁcients with standard errors. The dependent variable is Clinton vote choice, where 1 equals support
for Clinton, and 0 for all others. The change variables range from 21 to 1; all of the other independent variables range from 0 to 1. Each model predicts withinperson change in vote choice from wave 1 to wave 3. The impact of change in perceptions of gender favoritism does not differ signiﬁcantly by gender (.59, p p
.61). The impact of initial perceptions of gender favoritism also does not differ signiﬁcantly by gender (2.52, p p .72).
1 p ! .10.
* p ! .05.
** p ! .01.
*** p ! .001.

and other theories about the drivers of fear of gender favoritism directly.

DISCUSSION
Prior survey research carried out during the 2008 Democratic presidential primaries has found little evidence that
traditional gender stereotypes undercut support for Hillary
Clinton (Gervais and Hillard 2011; Huddy and Carey 2009;
Kinder and Dale-Riddle 2012; Tesler and Sears 2010). One
explanation is that there was something particular and unusual about Clinton’s candidacy that made this possible—

perhaps her many years of experience in politics or her emphasis on toughness and strong leadership. Then again, the
lack of an apparent double standard for Clinton among most
voters is consistent with a growing number of other recent
studies using a range of methods, contexts, and samples
(Brooks 2013; Dolan 2014; Fridkin and Kenney 2009; Hayes
2011; Hayes and Lawless 2015). The main conclusion from
these studies is that traditional gender stereotypes, although
they still clearly matter in many other aspects of society, are
no longer a political liability for female candidates in the vast
majority of cases.
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Table 6. Effects of Fear of Gender Favoritism on Clinton Vote
Preference in a Hypothetical 2008 General Election Matchup
(Wave 3): Logit
Men
Perceptions of gender favoritism
Attitudes about gender favoritism
Perceptions of racial favoritism
Attitudes about racial favoritism
Party identiﬁcation (Republican)
Race (black)
Education
Income
Age
South
Campaign contact
Political interest
Perceived relative issue agreement
Perceived relative ideological
proximity
Constant
Sample size
Pseudo-R2

Women

21.36***
(.36)
22.07***
(.36)
.79**
(.30)
1.26***
(.35)
23.49***
(.26)
.72*
(.30)
2.14
(.28)
2.33
(.39)
2.27
(.45)
.06
(.17)
.77*
(.34)
2.22
(.26)
3.56***
(.17)

21.41***
(.30)
21.56***
(.26)
.54*
(.23)
.40
(.27)
23.65***
(.21)
.81**
(.24)
2.28
(.23)
2.15
(.30)
2.21
(.38)
2.28*
(.13)
2.13
(.27)
2.14
(.21)
3.07***
(.14)

5.45***
(.52)
22.14***
(.51)
3,547
.72

4.74***
(.43)
2.87*
(.40)
4,562
.66

Note. Unstandardized logistic regression coefﬁcients with standard errors
in parentheses. The dependent variable is coded so that 1 equals support
for Clinton and 0 equals support for McCain. All other variables range
from 0 to 1. The pseudo-R2 is McFadden. The impact of perceptions of
gender favoritism does not differ by gender (.04, p p .93). The impact of
attitudes about gender favoritism is larger among men but not signiﬁcantly so (2.51, p p .24).
* p ! .05.
** p ! .01.
*** p ! .001.

Does this mean that voter gender bias more generally is a
thing of the past? The ﬁndings from this study strongly suggest that such bias remains, although in a form not previously
measured by scholars. The theory advanced here is that gender discrimination at the voting booth may arise because of

perceptions of female candidates as overly group interested.
By this account, women candidates may be harmed by voters’
fears that women who gain political power will redistribute
resources from men to women. To test whether fear of gender
favoritism reduces support for women candidates, I designed
new survey measures to assess the extent to which people
perceive women elected ofﬁcials as likely to use government to
aid women at the expense of men. I then included the new
measures on a nationally representative panel survey ﬁelded
during the 2008 presidential primaries.
As expected, across numerous analyses fear of gender
favoritism consistently reduced support for Hillary Clinton.
Democrats who said they expected women elected ofﬁcials to
engage in favoritism for women over men were far less likely
to side with Clinton over her male rivals for the Democratic
nomination, even after controlling for a wide range of other
factors. Moreover, fear of gender favoritism was associated
not only with vote choice in cross-sectional analyses but also
with over-time declines in support for Clinton at the individual level using ﬁxed effects panel models. Given the much
reduced role of partisanship in primary contests, one might
wonder whether fear of gender favoritism would have mattered during a general election contest. An additional analysis suggests that it would indeed have hurt Clinton had she
won the Democratic nomination. In a head-to-head matchup
between Clinton and John McCain, the Republican nominee,
those who feared gender favoritism were signiﬁcantly less
likely to support Clinton, even after taking account of party
identiﬁcation and other variables.
A logical implication of these analyses is that Hillary
Clinton may have faced bias from voters who feared gender
favoritism during the 2016 presidential campaign. As the ﬁrst
female presidential candidate of a major political party, voters’
gender attitudes may have played an especially important
role. During the 2008 campaign, Obama’s historic candidacy
produced the largest effects of racial attitudes on vote choice
recorded in modern times (Tesler and Sear 2010), and this
same pattern may well apply to gender attitudes in the 2016
election. Not only that, but insofar as Obama’s presence drew
unprecedented attention to race in 2008, his absence in 2016
may have reduced the effects of racial attitudes, perhaps leaving more space for gender attitudes to inﬂuence the vote. Then
again, even without Obama on the ballot race-related policies and immigration remained major issues during the 2016
campaign.
Still, the Clinton campaign itself went much further in
emphasizing the historic nature of her candidacy in 2016 than
in 2008, in particular her appeal to women and “women’s
issues,” such as pay equity and family leave policies. The explicit targeting of female voters is itself notable, and poten-
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tially risky, although scholars have yet to test whether such
appeals activate fear of gender favoritism speciﬁcally. Nonetheless, some evidence suggests that targeting women and
“women’s issues” may be beneﬁcial, although this has primarily been tested with male candidates (Abdullah 2012;
Schaffner 2005), with individual issues that are particularly
popular (e.g., domestic violence and sexual harassment; Anderson, Lewis, and Baird 2011; Holman, Schneider, and Pondel 2015), or by combining appeals to social groups in general
with appeals to women in particular (Herrnson, Lay, and
Stokes 2003). Ultimately, then, whether the beneﬁts of gender
targeting outweigh the costs of activating fears of gender favoritism is an open question.
Yet even setting aside the issue of Clinton’s gendertargeted appeals, there are other reasons why fear of gender
favoritism may have been more strongly activated during the
2016 campaign. Just as media portrayals that highlight group
conﬂict are more prone to activate ethnocentrism (Kinder
and Kam 2009), coverage highlighting gender divisions may
activate fear of gender favoritism. During the 2016 campaign,
then-Republican-nominee Donald Trump brazenly employed
sexist remarks against Clinton and other women and repeatedly attacked Clinton for playing the “women’s card.” Moreover, throughout the primary season and into the summer,
media coverage focused intensely on gender divisions in support for Clinton, which may suggest a group conﬂict frame
to voters. In sum, fear of gender favoritism may have played
an even stronger role in Clinton’s 2016 campaign than it did
in 2008.
The next question is whether and to what extent the effects
of fear of gender favoritism extend beyond Hillary Clinton.
As a ﬁrst step, we might consider the impact of these beliefs
on support for other women running for president, especially
given Clinton’s loss in 2016. Further, as the discussion above
suggests, context should play an important role in either intensifying or alleviating the impact of gender-based fears
given the extent to which the candidates and media highlight
gender. Partisanship may also be important, in light of some
evidence that voter gender bias is more likely to harm female
Democratic politicians than female Republican politicians
(Dolan 2014; Holman et al. 2011, 2017). Ultimately, is it undeniable that Hillary Clinton is a singular ﬁgure in American
politics, leaving some to suggest she is of “limited generalizability” (Lawless 2009, 70); others, however, argue that the
Clinton campaign is, in fact, quite generalizable (Carroll 2009).
Indeed, one reason Clinton has been a lightning rod for debates about gender has been that the public appears to project
their own anxieties on her (Burrell 2001). If so, then insofar as
those anxieties remain, their effects on other women candidates should remain as well.
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Although the effects of fear of gender favoritism may not
be speciﬁc to Clinton, gender-based attitudes may be especially inﬂuential among candidates seeking national ofﬁce (Fowler and Lawless 2009; Huddy and Terkildsen 1993a). Insofar
as men’s opposition to women candidates depends on fears of
losing resources and power to women, then candidates seeking more powerful ofﬁces should be more intensely harmed.
This could implicate campaigns for national ofﬁce and perhaps national executive ofﬁces in particular. The ﬂurry of recent studies ﬁnding limited voter gender bias in gubernatorial,
House, and Senate elections is consistent with this possibility
(e.g., Brooks 2013; Dolan 2014; Hayes and Lawless 2016).
Yet all of these studies focused on traditional concerns about
gender stereotyping. The potential impact of fear of gender
favoritism on vote choice in these contexts remains to be
tested.
My ﬁndings strongly suggest that fear of gender favoritism
is a serious harm to female candidates’ campaigns for elected
ofﬁce. In fact, recent gains in women’s political inﬂuence may
ironically promote stronger feelings of threat toward female
candidates. And the same could be said for other historically
underrepresented groups in the United States, too. Fear of
group favoritism may help to explain opposition not only toward women candidates but also toward LGBT, Latino, Asian
American, and black candidates (Baek and Landau 2011; Goldman 2017). Ultimately, we have only just begun to understand
the effects of fears of group favoritism on political behavior.
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